passlib.hash.pbkdf2_{digest} - Generic PBKDF2 Hashes¶
Passlib provides three custom hash schemes based on the PBKDF2 1 algorithm which are compatible with the modular crypt format:
pbkdf2_sha1pbkdf2_sha256pbkdf2_sha512
Security-wise, PBKDF2 is currently one of the leading key derivation functions, and has no known security issues. Though the original PBKDF2 specification uses the SHA-1 message digest, it is not vulnerable to any of the known weaknesses of SHA-1 2, and can be safely used. However, for those still concerned, SHA-256 and SHA-512 versions are offered as well. PBKDF2-SHA512 is one of the four hashes Passlib recommends for new applications.
All of these classes can be used directly as follows:
from passlib.hash import pbkdf2_sha256
# generate new salt, hash password
hash = pbkdf2_sha256.hash("password")
print(hash)
# > '$pbkdf2-sha256$6400$0ZrzXitFSGltTQnBWOsdAw$Y11AchqV4b0sUisdZd0Xr97KWoymNE0LNNrnEgY4H9M'
# same, but with an explicit number of rounds and salt length
print(pbkdf2_sha256.using(rounds=8000, salt_size=10).hash("password"))
# > '$pbkdf2-sha256$8000$XAuBMIYQQogxRg$tRRlz8hYn63B9LYiCd6PRo6FMiunY9ozmMMI3srxeRE'
# verify the password
print(pbkdf2_sha256.verify("password", hash))
# > True
print(pbkdf2_sha256.verify("wrong", hash))
# > False
Tip
-
password hash usage-- for more usage examples -
ldap_pbkdf2_{digest}-- alternate LDAP-compatible versions of these hashes.
Interface¶
pbkdf2_sha512: except for the choice of message digest, this class is the same as pbkdf2_sha256.
pbkdf2_sha1: except for the choice of message digest, this class is the same as pbkdf2_sha256.
Format & Algorithm¶
An example pbkdf2_sha256 hash (of password):
$pbkdf2-sha256$6400$.6UI/S.nXIk8jcbdHx3Fhg$98jZicV16ODfEsEZeYPGHU3kbrUrvUEXOPimVSQDD44
All of the pbkdf2 hashes defined by passlib
follow the same format, $pbkdf2-{digest}${rounds}${salt}${checksum}.
-
$pbkdf2-{digest}$is used as the modular-crypt-format identifier ($pbkdf2-sha256$in the example). -
{digest}- this specifies the particular cryptographic hash used in conjunction with HMAC to form PBKDF2's pseudorandom function for that particular hash (sha256in the example). -
{rounds}- the number of iterations that should be performed. this is encoded as a positive decimal number with no zero-padding (6400in the example). -
{salt}- this is theadapted base64 encoding(ab64_encode()) of the raw salt bytes passed into the PBKDF2 function. -
{checksum}- this is theadapted base64 encoding(ab64_encode()) of the raw derived key bytes returned from the PBKDF2 function. Each scheme uses the digest size of its specific hash algorithm ({digest}) as the size of the raw derived key. This is enlarged by approximately 4/3 by the base64 encoding, resulting in a checksum size of 27, 43, and 86 for each of the respective algorithms listed above.
The algorithm used by all of these schemes is deliberately identical and simple:
The password is encoded into UTF-8 if not already encoded,
and run through pbkdf2_hmac()
along with the decoded salt, the number of rounds,
and a prf built from HMAC + the respective message digest.
The result is then encoded using ab64_encode().
-
The specification for the PBKDF2 algorithm - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898#section-5.2, part of RFC 2898. ↩
-
While SHA1 has fallen to collision attacks, HMAC-SHA1 as used by PBKDF2 is still considered secure - http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html. ↩